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 When people are asked to estimate the probabilities 
of uncertain events, they often violate basic assumptions 
of probability theory. Thus they often fail to respect the 
additivity principle, which requires that the probabilities 
assigned to an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive 
outcomes should add up to 1, or 100%; no more, no less. 
For instance, if you think that your favorite singer has a 
70% chance of winning the European Song Contest, the 
other participants cannot have more than a 30% chance 
to share between them, regardless of how many they are 
and the quality of their performances. Similarly, a player’s 
probability of winning raffle should correspond to the 
percentage of tickets he or she owns, making up a total of 
100% for all players. However, whereas people (students) 
are relatively good at calculating the probabilities of 
random events, like the winning probabilities in a raffle, 
they often neglect the 100% rule in contexts where chances 
are unevenly distributed and non-random factors play a part. 
Students who were asked to estimate the winning chances 
for 20 countries participating in the European Song Contest 
gave them a mean probability of 27.7%, requiring five and a 
half rather than just one winner. Only three students out of 
31 produced estimates adding up to 100% (Teigen, 1988). 
1 - see page 13
 Previous studies of additivity violations have 
concluded that they tend to be subadditive, i.e., the 
probability of a complete set of events is often smaller 
than the probabilities assigned to the individual events in 
the set. For an exhaustive set, where the total probability 
is normatively equal to 100%, this total is typically smaller 
than the sum of its constituent parts, or, put differently, there 
is a tendency to overestimate the probabilities of individual 
outcomes. It has been suggested that this occurs because it is 
easier to recruit supporting evidence for alternatives that are 
specified compared to unspecified alternatives (Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994), but subadditive probabilities also occur in 
situations where all outcomes in the set are estimated in the 
same session and by the same judge (Fox & Tversky, 1998; 
Riege & Teigen, 2013; Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 
1983, 1988). Additivity neglect is most frequent for sets of 
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alternatives greater than two; with only two outcomes, most 
people will realize that the alternatives are complementary. 
A “probable” winner cannot at the same time be regarded 
as a “probable” loser. With more alternatives, the situation 
grows more complicated, and it becomes less obvious how 
each alternative should be compared to the rest of the set. 
One may accordingly have several favourites in a contest 
like ESC who can all be judged as “probable” winners. This 
requires that the individual candidates are not primarily 
viewed as members of a class of outcomes, with an average 
ignorance prior of p = 1/n, but instead as separate cases, 
each to be judged on its own. Individual probabilities 
might be estimated from each event’s perceived match with 
characteristics of the parent population, as suggested by the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; 
Teigen, 2004), or from the balance between supporting and 
non-supporting evidence, as suggested by support theory 
(Tversky & Koehler, 1994).
 To achieve a coherent set of estimates, participants 
have to adapt their case-based judgments to fit within 
the 100% frame dictated by probability theory. Such 
adjustments are sometimes enforced by explicit instructions 
(Haran, Moore, & Morewedge, 2010), and sometimes 
encouraged by introducing more subtle “additivity prompts” 
(Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 1997) or “extensional cues” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), like presenting the complete 
set of outcomes jointly to the same participants. However, 
it can be shown that a joint presentation format reduces, 
but does not eliminate, additivity neglect (Riege & Teigen, 
2013). Moreover, Riege and Teigen found that additivity 
neglect is format dependent: participants who produced 
their estimates by writing numbers in an empty slot next 
to each alternative generated more additive estimates 
than participants who made their estimates by circling 
numbers on 0-100% horizontal rating scales. In their final 
experiment, participants who generated and wrote their own 
estimates achieved 57% more additive responses compared 
to those who used rating scales. Written estimates and 
estimates obtained on rating scales have previously been 
used interchangeably in probability estimation tasks (often 
with no information given about how estimates have been 
obtained). It is accordingly important to establish format 
dependence as a replicable finding and to investigate more 
closely the processes responsible for this finding. The 
present research was conducted to compare probabilities 
obtained by both methods for a greater set of tasks than 
those used previously, and under stricter laboratory control. 
To uncover aspects of the deliberation process during 
probability estimation we made in the present study use of 
eye-tracking methodology.
 Eye movements during problem solving offer 
insights into natural shifts in attention and information 
acquisitions through fixations and saccades (Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Ranyard, 2011; 1999). Eye 
movements are naturally occurring behaviour and a 
generally valid measure of attention, information acquisition 
and a means to infer cognitive processes (Glaholt, 2011; 
Russo, 2011; Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011). Recorded 
fixations give information about what participants are 
looking at, and the direction of fixations can indicate their 
search strategies within a display of information. In addition, 
fixation durations (in milliseconds) have been used as an 
indirect measure of cognitive effort, with longer fixations 
being less common, and reflecting a heavier cognitive load 
than short fixations (Findlay & Kapoula, 1992; Horstmann, 
Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009). Eye-tracking methodology 
provides a means of investigating repeated inspections 
of the same material, by counting the number of revisits 
between (pre)defined Areas of Interest (AOI) on a screen, 
which in the present study comprises the problem text 
and the set of individual alternative outcomes. Fixations, 
inspection time, repeated inspections of outcomes (revisits), 
and fixation durations are predicted to differ according 
to whether participants assign probabilities by judging 
the alternatives one by one, in a case-based manner, or 
additively, as members of a set, which requires a distributive 
approach where alternatives are compared to each other. 
Specifically, the following predictions were made:
1. Participants who are asked to generate their own 
probability estimates without the aid of rating scales 
(henceforth: the Self-generated condition) will produce 
more additive responses than participants who are 
asked to pick probabilities displayed on horizontal 
scales (henceforth: the Scale condition), replicating the 
finding of Riege and Teigen (2013).
2. Participants in the Self-generated condition will use 
more time per task than participants in the Scale 
condition, because they have a more complex task to 
do: Not only do they evaluate the alternatives; they also 
have to consider the 100% rule by mentally keeping 
tabs on the sum of their predictions.
3. Participants in the Self-generated condition will have 
more fixations, partly due to longer deliberation time. 
This prediction is less obvious than those above, as 
1  A chance to replicate the experiment with experts arose more recently when a Norwegian TV production team decided to create a 
popular science program on mathematics in everyday life, and as part of this, invited four pop musicians and disk jockeys to listen to 20 songs 
submitted to the 2009 ESC finals, with the purpose of estimating the winning chances for each song. Their probability assessments were written 
on a blackboard, where the host of the show, a mathematician, proceeded to add up the numbers in front of the puzzled participants. The sums 
turned out to be 790%, 560%, 295%, and 975%, for the four individual experts, respectively. The show was repeated before the 2010 ESC 
finals in Norway, with four new experts (music professionals), who evaluated the chances of 25 participating countries, ending up with sums of 
1301%, 186%, 977%, and 676%. (There were, in fact, more than 25 countries participating, so this was not a completely exhaustive set.)
 Despite large individual variability, these results indicate a robust additivity neglect in all samples. A class-based approach would have 
yielded probabilities for individual songs around 5% (in 1986 and 2009) or 4% (in 2010), provided no winning chances for countries outside the list. 
Instead they obtained average winning probabilities of 27.7% (1986), 32.7% (2009), and 31.3% (2010). The experts were no better than the students, 
believing that they participated in an experiment about their “scent for music” (rather than their scent for probabilities). Evidently, the winning potential 
of each song was judged on its own merits, according to a case-based approach, with no consideration given to the number of competitors. (Thanks to 
producer Petter Nome in Teddy TV and television host Jo Røislien for inviting one of the present authors to the show and sharing the results with us.)
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participants in the Scale condition have more to look 
at, namely the scales, which may by itself increase the 
number of fixations in this condition.
4. Participants in the Self-generated condition will be more 
engaged in comparing alternatives, and accordingly 
have more repeated information inspections (revisits) 
than participants in the Scale condition.
5. Participants in the Self-generated condition will have 
longer fixations, reflecting a higher cognitive load. 
Method
 Participants and design. Thirty students recruited 
from the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Oslo participated in the study (23 women and 7 men; median 
age 22.5 years), without receiving any compensation for 
their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of 
two format conditions displayed in Figure 1. Participants 
in the Scale format condition were presented with a list of 
probabilities from 0 to 100% lined up to form a horizontal 
scale, whereas those in the Self-generated probabilities 
condition had to produce their own estimates, rather than 
picking the most appropriate number from a list.
 Material. The participants were given 10 
experimental and 2 control tasks, presented in random order 
(the same for all participants). The experimental tasks were 
probability estimation problems, eight of which were adapted 
from previous additivity studies. Half of the tasks had four 
potential outcomes and the other half had five potential 
outcomes. For example, one vignette asked participants 
to state their probability estimates of the outcomes of the 
upcoming (2013) general election in Norway, with four 
alternatives listed, namely: A social-democratic majority or 
minority cabinet and a non-socialist majority or minority 
cabinet (Riege & Teigen, 2013). Other vignettes asked them 
to predict the probability of five different exam grades for a 
hypothetical student (Teigen, 1983), four different reasons 
for a car that won’t start (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 
1978), four different consequences for a patient suffering a 
heart attack (Redelmeier, Koehler, Lieberman, & Tversky, 
1995), and so on. Answers to the experimental tasks had to 
be based on personal judgment, whereas the two control 
tasks, which were placed at the end of the session, described 
random events (the outcomes of dice throws and lottery 
draws) that could be answered by simple mental calculation.
The latter tasks were included to control for potential format 
differences affecting all responses and not just additivity 
tasks.
 Apparatus and procedure. Each problem was 
presented on a LCD monitor, with a resolution of 1680 
x 1050 pixels (due to technical errors two participants 
had a resolution of 1440 x 900, but inspection of visual 
stimuli and data revealed no differences). The stimuli was 
created using PowerPoint® software, showing text and 
outcomes on the same screen, including the 0-100% scales 
in the Scale condition, and blanks in the Self-generated 
response condition (see Figure 1). Each trial was preceded 
by a blank screen (1 s), followed by the judgment task. 
To make responses in the two conditions comparable, 
participants gave all answers orally, to be written down by 
the experimenter. However, participants were told that they 
could ask to have their responses read back as many times as 
they wanted within each task, but only few participants took 
advantage of this opportunity. This was done to ease their 
memory load and to make the tasks as similar as possible to 
the paper-and-pencil versions studied previously (Riege & 
Teigen, 2013). 
 Eye-tracking methodology. Binocular eye-
movements were recorded thorugh I-View Software© using 
the Remote Eye Tracking Device (RED) from SensoMotoric 
Instruments®, Teltow, Germany. The RED System recorded 
the eye tracking data at a rate of 60 Hz from a distance of 
0.5-1.0 m, with a resolution better than 0.1 degree. Prior to 
starting the experiment a 9-point calibration procedure was 
performed.
 The number of fixations, revisits (repeated 
inspections of the same information), and fixation durations 
were extracted for each participant and for each task, using 
Figure 1. The visual display of the two formats, as presented to participants. The question (in Norwegian) in this task is to estimate the 
probabilities for each of five months to have the highest number of “sunny days”, using a Self-generated format (left panel) or a Scale format 
(right panel).
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two predefined sets of non-overlapping areas of interest 
(AOIs). The first set divided the screen in two major 
AIOs, one around the text, and another containing all the 
alternatives. The second set included one AOI for each 
alternative. We thus had four AOIs for tasks containing four 
alternatives and five AOIs for tasks with five alternatives. 
This was done in order to get the number of fixations 
and revisits for each alternative. For both sets the AOIs 
containing alternatives were larger in the Scale condition, 
due to the area requirements of the scales themselves, as 
shown in Figure 1. If anything, this might allow for more 
fixations in the Scale conditions (the more there is to look 
at, the more one looks), working against our prediction of a 
higher number of fixations in the Self-generated condition. 
Results
 Probability estimates. Probability sums were 
calculated for each task by adding the probability estimates 
for all four or five alternatives. Cronbach’s α = .78 for tasks 
with four alternatives, and Cronbach’s α = .92 for tasks with 
five alternatives. Sums of 100% were defined as additive. 
Such responses occurred, as predicted, most frequently in the 
Self-generated condition. Participants in this condition gave 
on average 53% additive estimates, against 15% in the Scale 
condition. All tasks yielded approximately the same number 
of additive responses. Most non-additive estimates added up 
to much more than 100%, i.e., they were subadditive, as  seen 
in Table 1. These results replicate previous findings both by 
showing that the sums of probability estimates increase with 
number of alternatives, and more additivity neglect in the 
Scale condition. A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA of probability sums 
with number of alternatives (4 vs. 5) as a within-Ss factor 
and condition as a between-Ss factor revealed significant 
main effects both of numbers of alternatives, F(1,28) = 
10.86, p = .003, η2 = .28, and of condition, F(1,28) = 16.80, 
p< .001, η2 = .375. There was also a significant interaction 
effect, F(1,28) = 8.80, p = .006, η2 = .239, indicating that 
the effect of number of alternatives mainly occurred within 
the Scale condition.  The two control tasks were answered in 
an additive fashion by most participants in both conditions 
(90% and 77% additive answers in the lottery and dice 
vignette, respectively).
 Response time. Time per task for participants in 
the two conditions is presented in the two bottom rows of 
Table 1. Participants that were asked to produce their own 
estimates spent, on the average, 36.5% more time on the 
experimental problems than those who simply picked their 
numbers from the scales. On the control problems, no such 
difference was found. This is in line with our hypothesis that 
self-generated probability estimates are perceived as more 
demanding, and require more deliberation than estimates 
performed as ratings on a probability scale.
 Fixations. The mean numbers of fixations on the 
alternatives for both types of tasks are presented in the first 
two rows in Table 2. From the sheer extension of the spatial 
layout one would expect a greater number of fixations on the 
alternatives in the Scale condition than in the Self-generated 
condition where no scales were displayed. This was indeed 
the case for the two control problems, which led to nearly 
twice as many fixations in the Scale condition than in the 
Self-generated condition. However, for the experimental 
problems a different pattern emerged, with a higher number 
of fixations in the Self-generated conditions. A mixed 
analysis of variance with condition as a between-subjects 
factor and type of problem (experimental vs. control) as 
a within-subjects factors confirms a highly significant 
interaction between these two factors, F(1, 28)= 13.05, p = 
.001, η2 = .32. 
 More detailed information can be obtained by the 
Search Index (SI) originally developed by Payne (1976) for 
information search in a vertical/horizontal matrix. A search 
index based on eye-movements is calculated by subtracting 
vertical from horizontal transitions, divided by the total 
number of fixations. If participants mainly move their gaze 
across (within) each alternative, their search index will have 
a value from 0 to +1. If they mainly move their gaze between 
different alternatives the search index will take on values 
between –1 and 0. More extreme values indicate a more 
dominating search strategy (Franco-Watkins & Johnson, 
2011). Search index means were MSI = .34 (SDSI = .13) in 
the Self-generated condition against MSI = .57 (SDSI= .09) in 
the Scale condition. These means are significantly different 
from each other, with t(28) = 5.25, p< .001, Cohen’s d = 
2.07, indicating that participants move their gaze differently 
in the two conditions, with horizontal movements being 
especially predominant in the Scale condition.
Self-generated Scale t(28) p Cohen’s d
Total additive responses (of 10)  5.33 (3.56)    1.47 (2.75)   3.33 <.005  1.22
Probability sums
     Tasks with four outcomes 120.8%  (22.6) 155.1% (33.8)  -3.26 <.005 -1.19
     Tasks with five outcomes 122.8%  (36.0) 192.9%  (54.9)  -4.14 <.001 -1.51
Control tasks   98.7%  (3.4) 108.3%  (19.4)  -1.89    ns - 0.69
Time per task (sec)
     Additivity problems   75.9s (21.8)  55.6s (16.9)   2.84 <.005  1.04
     Control problems   54.8s (13.2)  50.9s (21.4)   0.46    ns  0.22
Table 1. Mean number of additive responses, mean sums of probability estimates, and mean time per task in two conditions (SD in parentheses).
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 The search index is based on relative rather than 
absolute frequencies, which makes it difficult to tell whether 
the higher SI values in the Scale condition is a function of 
fewer comparisons between alternatives, or simply due to a 
greater number of fixations along the horizontally arranged 
display of numbers accompanying each alternative. To 
capture a central aspect of the deliberation process, we 
counted the number of revisits between different areas of 
interest. Revisits are repeated inspections of an AOI that do 
not follow each other in time. Revisits between alternatives 
and text may indicate a need to check one’s understanding 
of the problem while estimating the probabilities involved. 
Such revisits were more common in the Self-generated 
condition than in the Scale condition, but only for the 
experimental tasks, as shown in the middle two rows of 
Table 2. Revisits within the set of alternatives are perhaps 
even more informative, by indicating a comparison of 
alternatives. As seen in the last two rows of Table 2, the 
two conditions differed in the number of revisits between 
alternatives in the experimental, but not in the control tasks. 
For the additivity tasks, the participants in the Self-generated 
condition had twice as many revisits than the participants in 
the Scale condition. In other words, participants were in this 
condition looking back and forth between the alternatives, 
indicating a comparison process between alternatives, 
whereas participants in the Scale condition tended to focus 
more exclusively on one alternative at the time. 
 A more detailed picture of the pattern of revisits 
is given in Figure 2, showing that the number of revisits 
was consistently higher for all alternatives in the Self-
generated condition. The figure also shows that participants’ 
revisits, in both conditions, declined systematically from 
the alternatives listed first to the alternatives listed last. 
This is a natural consequence of people’s preference to 
read from top to bottom (Orquin & Mueller-Loose, 2013), 
and in line with other studies showing that items at the top 
of a list are given more attention than items at the bottom 
(Shi, Wedel, & Pieters, 2013; Sütterlin, Brunner, & Opwis, 
2008). The line graph shows, in addition, that the tendency 
of revisiting the first two alternatives is especially strong in 
the Self-generated condition with four alternatives, which 
incidentally is the condition with the largest number of 
additive responses.
 Fixation durations have by some investigators 
been related to cognitive load (Findlay & Kapoula, 1992; 
Horstmann et al., 2009; Velichkovsky, 1999). Fixation 
Table 2. Mean number of fixations and revisits for additivity and control tasks in two conditions (SD in parentheses)
Self-generated Scale t(28) p Cohen’s d
Number of fixations 
     additivity tasks 130.2 (45.0) 101.9 (31.5)  1.99 .056  0.73
     control tasks 40.8 (18.5) 70.7 (53.6) -2.04 .051 -0.75
Revisits to text
     additivity tasks 8.6 (4.4) 5.6 (1.4)  2.48 .019  0.92
     control tasks 9.3 (4.9) 12.9 (5.1) -1.99 .056 -0.72
Revisits to alternatives
     additivity tasks 44.3 (20.3) 22.7 (11.2)  3.62 .001  1.30
     control tasks 15.7 (9.1) 20.6 (18.9) -0.90 .376 -0.33
Figure 2. Number of revisits per alternative in both conditions, for additivity tasks with four and five alternatives.
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durations were longer for fixations on alternatives than for 
fixations within the text area. In the Self-generated condition 
the mean durations were 283.9 ms for the alternatives and 
222.8 ms for the text, and in the Scale condition mean 
fixation durations were 300.1 ms (alternatives) and 220.0 
ms (text). A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA, with alternatives and 
text as the within-Ss factor and condition as the between-
Ss factor, revealed no significant main effect of condition, 
F(1,28) = .13, p = .73, η2 = .005, nor a significant interaction 
effect of fixation duration and condition, F(1,28) =.56, p = 
.46, η2 = .019. However, the difference  between viewing 
the alternatives and reading the text was significant, F(1,28) 
= 30.82, p< .001, η2 = .524, suggesting a higher cognitive 
effort while viewing the alternatives than during reading.
Discussion
 The results of this study provide strong 
confirmations of four of the five predictions listed in the 
introduction. 
 1. First, we replicated the finding by Riege and 
Teigen (2013) concerning the effects of response format on 
additivity neglect. Participants who are asked to assess the 
probabilities of an exhaustive set of outcomes fail to obtain 
a coherent set of estimates (i.e., sums of 100%) when using 
rating scales, but succeed more often to provide additive 
values when generating their estimates without this “aid”. 
We used in this experiment a larger set of tasks than in 
previous studies, each with four or five mutually exclusive 
outcomes. It turned out that participants could not simply 
be divided dichotomously into a group of “additive” and 
another group of “non-additive” responders, as only two 
participants in the Self-generated condition gave additive 
responses to all ten tasks (and only one gave none). In the 
Scale condition, in contrast, most responders (11 out of 15) 
gave non-additive responses to all ten tasks. 
 We also demonstrated that additivity neglect did 
not extend to tasks involving chance events (the control 
tasks), where correct answers could be calculated according 
to elementary probability rules as the ratio between 
“favorable” and total number of cases. In the previous 
study by Riege and Teigen (2013), the two conditions 
also differed in the way answers were submitted: whereas 
participants in the Scale condition responded by circling 
an appropriate number on the scale, they were in the Self-
generated condition asked to write or type their estimates on 
an assigned empty slot, perhaps imparting to them a stronger 
feeling of accountability for their responses, which has in 
other contexts been shown to attenuate judgmental biases 
(for an overview, see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In the present 
experiment, answers were conveyed to the experimenter 
in the same way in both conditions, namely by speaking 
them out aloud, perhaps strengthening the perceived 
accountability for participants in both conditions. Other 
than that, their spontaneous comments were not recorded, 
but the debriefing session revealed that several participants 
had been in doubt whether the 100% rule applied or not 
(even among those in the Scale condition who decided to 
neglect it). 
 2. Secondly, we found, as predicted, that responses 
to the additivity tasks took longer time in the Self-generated 
condition, despite the fact that the Scale condition provided 
a richer visual material to watch. This is compatible 
with Horstmann et al.’s (2009) integrated process 
assumption, which is a dual-process theory postulating 
common automatic processes that underlie all types of 
decision making, but that these automatic processes are 
supplemented with additional deliberate processing steps 
when needed. Such supplementary adjustments, which 
here imply a revision of intuitive probabilities to satisfy 
additivity requirements, will by necessity slow down the 
time needed for emitting a response. 
 3. Despite the visual display, which offered 
participants in the Scale conditions more to look at (cf. Figure 
1), participants in the Self-generated conditions had more 
fixations, especially  when fixations to the experimental 
and control tasks are being compared: Participants in the 
Self-generated condition had 3.2 times more fixations 
on the additivity tasks than on the control tasks, whereas 
participants in the Scale condition had only 1.4 times more 
fixations on additivity tasks than on the controls. 
 4. The number of revisits was, as predicted, far 
greater in the Self-generated than in the Scale condition, 
indicating that participants in the former condition were 
more strongly engaged in comparing the alternatives, rather 
than evaluating each alternative in isolation. The visual 
layout of the screen could have contributed to this effect by 
facilitating vertical eye movements in the condition without 
scales, or discouraging such movements in the condition 
where alternatives are separated by horizontal rating 
scales, increasing the distance between the alternatives 
(as seen in Figure 1). Participants who strive to minimize 
attention costs (Orquin & Muller-Loose, 2013) will choose 
to compare pairs of alternatives based on spatial proximity 
(Russo & Rosen, 1975). It has also been suggested that 
eye movements can replace working memory as a storage 
and retrieval system due to the easy way the eyes gather 
information (Droll & Hayhoe, 2007), perhaps making such 
comparisons easier in the Self-generated condition.
 Comparisons appear to be crucial for achieving an 
additive response pattern. An analysis across items (the ten 
additivity tasks) showed that mean number of revisits was 
consistently larger for participants who produced additive 
responses than for those that did not. Participants in the 
Self-generated condition who produced additive sums had 
on the average 49.7 revisits per task, against 38.3 revisits 
for those who made non-additive estimates, t(9) = 3.15, p 
= .012, Cohen’s d = 2.06. A parallel difference could be 
observed in the Scale condition, with a mean of 33.1 revisits 
per task for those (very few) who produced additive sums, 
against 20.9 for those who did not, t(9) = 4.01, p = .003, 
Cohen’s d = 2.82.
 5. The hypothesis of longer fixation durations in the 
Self-generated condition was the only of our predictions that 
was not confirmed. It appears that the percentages of “long” 
fixations (≥ 500 ms) were in both conditions considerably 
higher than those reported by Horstmann et al. (2009), with 
M(Self-generated) = 11% and M(Scale) = 13%, against approximately 
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2% in Horstmann et al.’s city size task. This indicates that 
the probability estimation tasks in both conditions required 
considerable cognitive effort. However, fixation durations 
were more variable in the Self-generated condition, with SD 
= 103.2 vs. SD = 41.9 in the Scale condition (F = 13.33, p 
= .001), possibly reflecting a relationship between fixation 
duration and additive response.
 To test the potential effects of fixation durations, a 
multiple regression analysis was conducted with condition 
(dummy coded: 1 = Self-generated, 2 = Scale), mean revisits, 
and fixation durations as independent predictor variables 
and the number of additive responses as the dependent 
variable. This analysis revealed significant simple effects of 
condition (Beta = −.368, t = −2.25, p = .033), mean revisits 
(Beta = .373, t = 2.26, p = .033), and mean fixation durations 
(Beta = .434, t = 3.16, p = .004). These results indicate that 
all three predictor variables are related to the number of 
additive responses. However, these results do not allow any 
strong inferences to be drawn about the causal relationship 
between search pattern and additivity. On one hand, it is 
reasonable to assume that an additive approach requires 
more mental effort, leading to longer fixation durations. It 
will also take more time and require repeated inspections 
of the alternatives, causing many revisits to occur. On 
the other hand, a search pattern with multiple revisits and 
comparisons of alternatives will increase the chances of 
obtaining an additive set of responses. Some studies suggest 
that that fixation processes could have a causal effect on 
both the comparison process and decision process (Armel, 
Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 
2010; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003).  Most 
likely, the questionnaire format lies at the root of both 
effects: the Scale format suggests that alternatives might be 
evaluated individually, according to a case-based approach, 
and discourages comparisons between alternatives, whereas 
Self-generated estimates facilitate a class-based approach 
and make people engage in a more comprehensive search 
pattern.
 The present research was not intended to uncover 
all factors contributing to additivity neglect. From prior 
research we know that number of alternatives is inversely 
related to additivity; the higher the number of alternatives, 
the smaller the number of participants who manage to 
distribute probabilities between alternatives in an additive 
fashion (Teigen, 1983). Numeracy, defined as a person’s 
ability or skill to reason with numbers and mathematical 
concepts, can also play a role. High numeracy scores have 
been found to be related to additive responses, but mostly 
when the numeracy test was given prior to the probability 
tasks (Riege & Teigen, 2013), prompting participants to 
apply their mathematical skills to the probability judgments. 
It has further been suggested that numeracy is related to 
working memory capacity (Cokely & Kelly, 2009), which 
has also been claimed to be essential for additive responding 
(Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). Measures of numeracy and 
working memory capacity were not included in the present 
experiment, as our focus was on the effects of presentation 
mode and response format rather than individual differences. 
 These results have implications for our 
understanding of how people make probability estimates. 
On one hand one could argue that people in real life rarely 
encounter situations where they are given the full set of 
outcomes and that this might make tasks such as these 
slightly unrealistic. At the same time, the simultaneous 
display of all outcomes should facilitate comparison between 
alternatives, and might be expected to encourage additive 
responding. This is probably the first study of additivity 
where participants are given as many as ten problems in 
a row, all with a similar structure, which could give them 
an opportunity to develop a common strategy based on 
distributional thinking in the course of the experiment. 
Yet, even participants who occasionally produced additive 
estimates did not repeat this response pattern consistently on 
consecutive problems. Estimates of singular events (which 
are more common outside the laboratory) would probably 
be even less restricted by distributional considerations, and 
as a consequence, severely overestimated.
 The present research also shows that the way we ask 
participants to respond can make their estimates more or less 
consistent with mathematical norms. Asking participants to 
generate their own probabilities seems to make them think 
a little harder, as indicated by the eye tracking measures. 
Format differences might accordingly activate different 
cognitive processes. The present study could thereby have 
implications for studies of other probabilistic biases, as 
for instance overconfidence, base rate neglect, and the 
conjunction fallacy, where responses are sometimes given 
as free numerical estimates and sometimes as ratings along 
a numerical scale. If self-generated numbers require more 
deliberate thought, the use of this response format might 
affect or attenuate some of these biases as well. 
 The present findings may also have relevance for 
rating scales applied to other domains. Several studies have 
shown that the way questions are posed, and the way rating 
scales are constructed, can strongly influence the answers 
obtained (e.g., Schwartz, 1999). For the past decade it has 
been increasingly common within this field to use eye-
tracking as a means to investigate how people respond to 
surveys (Galesic, Tourangeau, Couper, & Conrad, 2008; 
Graesser, Cai, Louwerse, & Daniel, 2006; Redline & 
Lankford, 2001). The present study adds to this literature by 
showing that even numeric responses on a 0-100 probability 
dimension will be answered differently depending upon 
whether the numbers are picked from a list arranged on a 
horizontal scale, or produced by the participants themselves. 
The study also shows that this difference is mirrored in 
the pattern of information search suggested by these two 
questionnaire formats. 
 The extensive use of rating scales in psychology 
is probably due to a need of standardizing people’s 
judgments of quantities; investigators may also share the 
implicit belief that predefined scales somehow make the 
task “easier” for participants. While it may be difficult to 
come up with numerical estimates reflecting, for instance, 
a persons’ degree of responsibility for a decision or the 
percentage of one’s time spent on work or leisure activities, 
it might appear easier to emit one’s answers by simply 
circling numbers on an appropriate scale. The present data 
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suggests that this “ease” can have an objective counterpart 
in shorter response time, fewer fixations, and a smaller 
number of repeated inspections between alternatives. This 
ease might come with a cost: participants who spend fewer 
resources on deliberation and comparison processes, might 
turn out to be more vulnerable to contextual influences (for 
instance from superficial features of the response scale). 
They may also yield less reliable results, and fail to reflect 
the participant’s “true” or carefully considered opinion. 
An interesting suggestion that might be considered in 
further studies is whether self-generated estimates can be 
considered as more cautious and perhaps less extreme than 
estimates given on rating scales where all values are made 
equally accessible. Alternatively, responses on a rating scale 
may be anchored in the middle, apparently “neutral” value, 
whereas numerical estimates produced without this aid may 
be more dependent upon one’s mental representation of 
numbers (e.g., from low to high), and of probabilities (e.g., 
likely versus unlikely).
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